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Summary findings
The primary distinction in a North-South  trade accord is  impact on investment flows. Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel
likely to be that the Southern nation experiences more  try to understand  the channels through which trade
capital scarcity than its Northern  trade partner.  So the  accords can affect North-South  investment flows.
trade accord's impact on the Southern trading partner's  A potential link between trade accords and investment
ability to attract capital may have welfare implications  flows may be how the accords affect the ability of the
for both nations.  Southern partner  government to make commitments
Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel extend the traditional  about the treatment of foreign investment. They show
analysis of customs unions to allow for international  that these accords can affect both the magnitude and
capital movements. Their results indicate that trade  pattern of inward foreign investment and production,
accords may affect the ability of Southern nations to  implying the possibility that both trade and financial
attract capital and may divert capital between Southern  diversion can stem from a bilateral regional trade accord.
nations.  Novel effects that emerge under sovereign risk must be
Moreover, the welfare implications of North-South  addressed when assessing the welfare implications of
trade accords may differ from those that predict the  trade accords. The greatest gains from integration are
North  American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA)  still achieved when integration takes place between the
minor third-country effects, holding factor endowments  countries with the greatest potential gains from trade.
constant.  But Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel make a distinction:
The key implications of North-South trade accords  these gains now include both current trade and inter-
such as NAFTA are generally perceived to involve their  temporal trade through foreign investment.
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The recent debate  concerning the  North American Free  Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in  both  policy circles  and  the  popular press  suggested that  the  primary
impact of  the  regional trade  accord would not be  a  small reduction in  already low
tariff  levels  between  the  NAFTA  partners,  but  a  fundamental  change  in  the
attractiveness of  Mexico as a  location for investment, resulting in a  large amount of
capital movement between the Northern and Southern trading partners. This claim was
popularized  by such opponents  of NAFTA as Ross Perot who claimed that NAFTA would
create a  "large sucking sound" as capital flowed from North to South in response to
the  trade accord. Indeed, there is  some evidence that "financial diversion" has taken
place in response to  North-South integration, both in the case of  Portugal and Spain
in the EEC and Mexico under NAFTA [Primo Braga (1993)].
Despite the consensus  that the impact of trade accords on capital movements
is  potentially  important,  the  issue  seems  to  have  received  less  attention  in  the
standard literature on  the  welfare implications of  customs unions,1 which center on
the  trade-off between trade creation and trade  diversion. 2 We  should note that this
is  even  true  of  more  recent  analyses of  trade  accords which  stress both  strategic
issues  [McLaren  (1993),  Bagwell and  Staiger  (1993)]  and  the  political-economic
implications of trade accords [Grossman  and Helpman (1993)]. The reason for this gap
in  the  literature is  probably historical. Prior  to  NAFTA,  successful regional trade
1See Lipsey (1960) and  de  Melo et  al  (1993) for  extensive early and more  recent
surveys.
2Notable exceptions include Miyagiwa  and Young (1986) who explicitly introduce factor
mobility into their analysis of customs unions in  a  different context, and Manchester
and McKibbin (1994) who analyze the implications  of an ad hoc decrease in Mexico's
risk premium as a result of the NAFTA accord.
1areas tended to be between Northern countries,  such as the EEC and the US-Canada free
trade  area.  As  the  first  major  North-South  free  trade  area,  the  NAFTA  raises  issues
which  are not  central to  North-North  trade  accords.
The  primary  distinction  in  a  North-South  trade  accord  is  likely  to  be  that
the  Southern  nation  is  physical  capital  scarce  relative  to  its  Northern  trade
partner.  Consequently,  the  impact  of  the  trade  accord  on  the  ability  of  the  Southern
trading  partner  to  attract  capital  may  have  welfare  implications  for  both  Northern
and  Southern  nations.  In  this  paper,  we  extend  the  traditional  analysis  of  customs
unions  to  allow  for  international  capital  movements.  Our  results  indicate  that  trade
accords  may  affect  the  ability  of  Southern  nations  to  attract  capital,  and  may  divert
capital  between  Southern  nations.  Moreover,  the  welfare  implications  of  North-South
trade  accords  may  differ  from  those  which  predict  minor  third-country  impacts  of
NAFTA  holding factor  endowments constant [Safadi and  Yeats (1993)].
We begin by  introducing  a  model of  a bi-lateral  free trade  accord  between a
Northern  and  Southern  nation which  relies  on capital from  the North  for  production  in
its  foreign  sector.  The  model  is  one  where  the  Southern  nation  faces  a  standard
timing-inconsistency  problem  concerning  levels  of  taxation  on  foreign  investment.  The
Southern  nation  then  commits  to  national  treatment,  or  equal  levels  of  taxation,
towards  foreign  investments  under  the  trade  accord.  We  then  show  that  the  trade
accord  can  be  an  effective  mechanism  for  achieving  enlarged  levels  of  commitment
towards  foreign  investments  and  therefore  can  generate  additional  capital  inflows
from  the North.
There  is  some  anecdotal  evidence  that  Southern  nations  already  understand
the  potential  of  bi-lateral  and  multilateral  treaties  as  a  mechanism  for  achieving
greater  international  credibility.  Mexico  has  explicitly  committed  to  national
treatment  and  codified  numerous  investment regime  liberalizations  towards  its  NAFTA
2partners  under  the  NAFTA  accord,  even  though  it  had  previously  underwent  a  large
reform  program  in  1989  [Hufbauer  and  Schott  (1992)].  Apparently,  the  reason  for
repeating  these  liberalizations  under  NAFTA  was that  tying  their  commitments  to  the
trade  accord  provided  an  explicit  mechanism  for  penalizing  their  violation  towards
investors  from  NAFTA  partner  countries.  For  example,  prior  to  the  NAFTA  accord,
Hufbauer  and  Schott  (1992)  predicted  that  "Since  regulations  are  more  easily  changed
than laws,  the United States and Canada are likely to seek commitments from Mexico in
the  NAFTA  to  make  regulatory  reform  more  permanent."  Along  similar  lines,  Chile
offered  to  unilaterally  commit  to  some  liberalizing  policies  under  the  Uruguay  round
of  the  GATT.3 The  ability  to  use  trade  accords  as  credibility-enhancing  mechanisms
may  therefore  be  an  aspect  of  regional  trade  accords  which  may  be  particularly
important  in North-South  agreements.4
We  next  examine  the  implications  of  a  trade  accord  between  a  Northern
nation  and  a  Southern  nation  in  a  3-country  model  of  foreign  direct  investment  in
which  Northern  investors  choose  the  magnitude  of  investment in  the  Southern  partner
nation  and  an  alternative  potential  Southern  target  nation.  We  demonstrate  that  the
standard  analysis  of  trade-diverting  customs  unions  must  be  adjusted  to  account  for
changes  from  the  union  in  the  risk  characteristics  of  the  trading  partners.  The  union
enhances  the  safety  of  investments  in  the  Southern  partner  nation,  increasing  the
3We thank Andres  Velasco for providing this  example.
4Perroni  and  Whalley  (1993)  interpret  the  same  liberalizations  as  concessions  to
larger  entities  in  return  for  insurance  against  trade  wars.  These  two  interpretations
do  not  necessarily  conflict;  if  a  mutually  beneficial  agreement  requires  these
liberalization  "concessions,"  a  Southern  trade  partner  may  be  unable  to  achieve  the
agreement  in  the  absence  of  the greater  commitment  capacity the  accord  brings  in  the
context  of  our analysis below.
3gains  experienced  by  the  Northern  partner  nation  from  trading  with  its  Southern
partner.  This  enhances  the  potential  for  the  regional  trade  accord  to  be  welfare
increasing,  even  when  trade  is  diverted  from  a  more  productive  alternative  Southern
location for  production.
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  divided  into  three  sections.  Section  2
introduces  the  basic  model  and  demonstrates  how  the  trade  accord  can  affect  the
credibility  of  the  Southern  partner  government  and  the  magnitude  of  its  capital
inflows.  Section  3  examines  the  3-country  case  with  both  trade  creation  and
diversion.  Section 4 concludes.
II. A Simple Two-period Model of Foreign Direct Investment  Under a Trade Accord
2.1  Setup
In  this  section,  we  introduce  a  simple  two-period  model  of  foreign  direct
investment  from  a  Northern  nation  to  a  Southern  nation  enforced  by  a  bi-lateral  trade
accord.  We  assume  that  there  are  2  countries  in  the  accord,  which  we  call  the
Northern  partner  and  the  Southern  partner.  The  Southern  partner  nation  produces  a
single  good,  s,  and  exports  that  good  to  the  Northern  partner.  For  simplicity,  we
assume  that  all  output  is  exported,  so  that  the  Southern  partner  government  is  only
interested  in  maximizing  domestic  income.  In  the  absence  of  a  trade  accord,  the
Northern  partner  charges  its  "most-favored-nation"  tariff  of  T  on  all  imports  of  s,
including those  from  the Southern  partner.
We  take  the exports  of  the  Northern  partner  as  numeraire,  and  assume  that
the  Northern  partner  nation  is  large  relative  to  the  Southern  partner  nation.  The
Southern  partner  enjoys  a  tariff  advantage  under  the  trade  accord.  Exports
originating  in  the  Southern  partner  nation  earn  price  P(1 +T)  (the  consumer  price
inclusive of  the tariff)  under  the accord,  and P  in  its absence.
4The  Southern  partner  nation  is  endowed  with  a  domestic  sector  which
produces  quantity  ss  of  good  s,  where  s  is  taken  as  exogenous.  The  foreign  sector
produces  quantity  sn  of  good  s  using  its  imported  foreign  capital  K  ,  which  is
determined  below,  according  to  the constant returns  production function:
(1)  s  = AK
where  A is a  constant.
The  Southern  partner  charges  a  tax  on  the  output  of  domestic  and  foreign
owners  of  capital,  and  is  assumed  to  have  made  a  "pledge"  of  national  treatment
towards  foreign  investment.  Formally,  we  model  the  implications  of  this  pledge  as  a
commitment  to tax domestic and  foreign output at the same rate,  which  we designate  as
t.  In  the absence  of  a  trade  accord,  the  only mechanism which  binds  this commitment
is  the  value  that  the  Southern  partner  government  places  on  its  "goodwill"  in  the
international  community.5 We  model  the  penalty  for  loss  of  goodwill  as  a  proportion
of  the  value  of  the  economic  resources  of  the  economy.  Since  the  importance  of
goodwill  is  uncertain  to  investors,  and  likely  to  be  affected  by  external  parameters,
we  specify  this  proportion  as  a  stochastic  function,  02,  where  0  is  an  exogenous
positive  constant  fraction  and  o  is  distributed  according  to  the  density  function
f(n)  along  the  interval  [0,11,6 f'>O.  Note  that  since f(Q)  is  invariant  with  respect
5National  treatment  is  assumed  only  for  concreteness;  the  results  hold  true  for  any
given  tax  pledge  t.  Here  we  assume  that  the  nationality  of  foreign  investors  cannot
be  observed  and,  therefore,  the  loss  of  "goodwill"  applies  equally  to  all  foreign
investment  and  all  Northern  investors  equally  benefit  from  the  accord.  In  practice,
some  degree  of  nationality  discrimination  favoring  firms  associated  with  the  Northern
partner  nation  is likely  to be  feasible.
6The  restriction  to  the  unit  interval  is  done  for  notational  simplicity  and  without
5to  t,  a  Southern  partner  nation  choosing  to  abrogate  national  treatment  will  choose
to  fully tax the proceeds of  the Northern  subsidiary.7
The  strategic  interaction  between  the North  and  the  South  has the  following
extensive  form:  In  the  first  stage,  Northern  investors  choose  the  magnitude  of
capital,  Kn,  to  extend  to  the  Southern  partner.  In  the  second  stage,  Q is  realized
and  the  penalty  faced  by  the  Southern  partner  for  violating  her  pledge  of  national
treatment  to  foreign  investors  is  determined.  In  the  third  stage,  the  Southern
partner  decides  whether  to  comply  with  its  pledge  of  national  treatment  or  to  tax
foreign  investment  at  a  higher  rate.  We  assume  that  all  government  revenues  are
distributed  lump-sum to  domestic  agents.
2.2  Southern Partner  Government Taxation Decision.
To  insure  sub-game  perfection,  we  begin  with  the  stage  three  decision  of
the  Southern  partner  concerning  compliance  with  national  treatment.  The  Southern
partner  government  is assumed to  levy a domestic tax of rate t  on output (t<l),  which
we take  as given.8
any  loss  of  generality  (provided  that  $2  is  in  the  unit  interval)  since  we  have
placed  no  restriction  on the  form  of f(n).
7While  our  simple  specification  yields  full  taxation  under  violation  of  national
treatment,  actual  expropriation  of  foreign  investment  is  relatively  rare,
particularly  recently  [Kobrin  (1984)].  Nevertheless,  this  simplification  drives  none
of the  qualitative results.
8The  analysis  begs  the  question  of  the  "optimal  tax"  for  maximizing  government
revenues  from  the  foreign  sector.  However,  we  do  not  pursue  the  analysis  here  both
because  domestic  taxes  are  the  outcomes  of  much  more  complicated  processes  and
because  even  within the confines  of  this  simple model we  found that  the optimal  level
6The  Southern  partner  government  then  chooses  whether  to  comply  with
national  treatment  and  charge  t  to  its  foreign  investors  or  to  violate  national
treatment  and  fully  tax  foreign  sector  output.  We  assume  that  the  Southern  partner
nation  is  expelled  from  the  trade  accord  under  violation  of  national  treatment.
Consequently,  under  compliance,  Southern partner  nation income  is equal  to:
(2)  W =  P(J+T)[tsn  +  S5]
while under  full taxation  income satisfies:
A
(3)  W =  P[S 5 +  52(1  - 0Q)
The  trade  accord  therefore  enhances  the  potential  penalty  for  violation  of  national
treatment.  In  the  absence  of  the  trade  accord,  only  the  goodwill  penalty  can  be
applied.  Under  the  trade  accord,  however,  violation  leads  to  the  goodwill  penalty
plus the loss of  terms of trade  advantage.
Define  Q  as  the  realization  of  Q  which  leaves  the  Southern  partner
government  indifferent  between  compliance  with  national  treatment  and  full  taxation
of  the  foreign  sector  (W= RW. The  existence  of  such  a  realization  Q  requires  the
realistic  assumption  that  the  probability  of  violation  of  national  treatment  is
*
strictly  between  0  and  1,  so  that  O<Q  <1.  This  is ensured  by  assuming  that  in  the
absence of  country risk,  investment would earn positive profits.  Q  satisfies:
(4)  - (I  +T)  (tSn+s)/(sn+s)  ]
Equation  (4)  demonstrates  the  characteristics  of  the  Southern  partner
government  taxation  decision.  First,  the  larger  is  the  foreign  sector  output  Sn,
ceteris  paribus,  the  more  likely  is  full  taxation,  since  the  gains  from  full  taxation
of  t  turns  out  to be  very  poorly  behaved as a function of  T.
7are  larger.  This  is  similar to  the  "opportunism" case  in  Cole and  English (1991).
Second,  the  risk  of  full  taxation  is  decreasing  in  the  level  of  the  national
treatment  tax  rate,  t.  The  intuition  behind  this  result  is  that  the  larger  is  the
level of  the  domestic tax  rate  on  the  foreign sector, the  lower the additional gains
from  full  taxation.  Third,  since  both  the  gains  from,  and  the  penalties  for,
violation of  national treatment are  proportionate to  the  price  level,  the  price  level
does  not  enter  as  an  argument. Finally,  the  risk  of  violation of  national treatment
is decreasing in the tariff advantage enjoyed under the trade accord, r.
We can then define o  as the probability that the Southern partner complies
with national treatment. o satisfies:
(5)  e  = f  *f(n)do.
Combining equations (4) and (5),  o  is a function of Kn  and T.  We can then
characterize the relationship  between o  and K  and T  as: n
(6)  ae/aT  =  f(Q  (I/O - Q(1  +T-)  >  0.
(7)  ae/aKn =  -f(n  )(1+i)A(I-t)s  /O(s +s)2  <  O.
2.3  Northern Agents'  Investment Decision.
The Northern investors are assumed to  be risk neutral and have access to
international capital  markets  at  rate  r.  We  assume  that  the  investment  of  the
representative  owner  of  foreign  capital  in  the  Southern  partner  nation  is
sufficiently small  that  its  liability associated with  this  investment is  not  limited.
Since individual foreign investors are  small relative to  the  Southern partner nation,
they  also  take  o  as  given  when making their  investment decision.  The zero-profit
condition then satisfies:
8(8)  e(1-t)P(1+T)A  =  r
The  above  expression implicitly defines the  equilibrium solution Kn(i).  As  a
notational convenience, we  can  express the  price  earned  by  the  Southern partner
nation as P(1 +T),  where in the absence of the accord T=O  and under the accord T=T.
Substituting  Tr for T in (6), (7), and (8) and totally differentiating  yields:
dKn  0/(1+T)  +  (ao/8l)  >  O
dT  aol a  8 Kn
There are two independent  channels, which are captured by the numerator of
(9),  through which an increase in  T  serves to  attract foreign capital. The first term
reflects the  terms of  trade improvement experienced by  the  Southern partner nation.
The second term  reflects the  decrease in the  probability of expropriation due to  the
enhanced  potential  penalty  associated with  the  price  effect  of  losing  the  trade
accord.  The  greater  are  the  price  benefits of  the  accord  to  the  Southern partner
nation as  measured by  T,  therefore, the  greater  is  the  increase in  the  penalty for
expropriation and hence the increase in the magnitude of capital inflows.
2.4  Impact  on  Southern Partner Income
While the small country assumption maintained in this section precludes any
welfare implications for the  North,  the current setting provides a  good  overview of
the income implications of the trade accord for the Southern Partner nation.
Define E(U) as the expected income earned by the Southern partner nation.
E(U) satisfies:
Q
(10)  E(U)  =  oW  +  IWf()dQ.




(11)  8  =  Pe(ts +sSj +  [OP(J+T)  + f (1-O2)f(Q)d2]d
a-r  n1  fo  dr
Equation  (11)  identifies  two  channels  through  which  the  welfare  of  the
Southern  partner  nation  is  affected  by  the  trade  accord:  The  first  term  reflects  the
direct  positive  increase  in  earnings  due  to  the  tariff  advantage.  The  second  term
reflects  the  increase  in  expected  revenue  from  the  foreign  sector due  to  the  increase
in foreign  investment,  defined by  equation (9).  Both  of these terms are positive.
It  is  interesting  to  note  the  characteristics  of  the  Southern  partner
nation  which  would  cause it to  experience greater  income gains  from  the  trade  accord.
First,  the  increase  in  income  will  be  greater  the  greater  is  the  magnitude  of  trade
with  the  Northern  partner  nation.  This  stems  both  from  the  direct  price  effect  on
Southern  exports  and  from  the impact  of the  trade  accord on  the magnitude  of  capital
inflows  the  Southern  partner  nation  can  attract,  as  shown  in  (9).  Second,  the
Southern  partner  will  experience  greater  benefits  from  the  trade  accord  the  greater
is  the  initial  safety  of  the  Southern  partner  nation.  Since  increasing  T  enhances  the
payoff  under  compliance  with  national  treatment  and  fails  to  affect  the  payoff  under
violation,  the  impact  of  a  change  in  the  initial  safety  of  the  Southern  partner
nation  will be  a greater  increase in  the magnitude of capital  inflows.
III. Extension to Two Potential Target nations
3.1  Setup
In  this  section,  we  extend  the  analysis  to  allow  the  trade  accord  to  affect
the  pattern  of  investment  across  the  South.  This  requires  us  to  treat  the  Southern
partner  country  as  "large"  in  terms  of  having market  power  with  respect  to  the price
of  its  export  good.  To  accomplish this  in  as  simple a  manner  as  possible,  we  assume
10that  there  are  two  potential  locations  of  production:  Country  A,  the  Southern  partner
nation,  and  country  B,  an  alternative  location,  that  can  be  thought  as  the  rest  of
the  South.  We  assume  that  the  output  of  the  two  nations  are  perfect  substitutes and
maintain  the  assumption  that  individual  northern  firns  behave  competitively,  despite
the  fact  that  their country  has market  power  in  aggregate.  We also  maintain  the above
assumption  that  all  output  is  exported  to  the  Northern  partner  nation,  so  that
exports  from  country A  earn price  P(1+T)  while exports  from  country B earn  price  P.
Let  reflect  the  output  of  the  foreign  sector  of  country  Z  (Z=A,B).  We
assume  that the production  function  for SZ satisfies:
(12)  Sz  = ZKe.  (Z=A,B; z=a,b).
where  a  and  b  are  constants  representing  the  productivity  of  the  Southern  target
countries  A  and  B  respectively,  while  Kn  is  the  magnitude  of  foreign  capital n
attracted  by country Z.
Let  reflect  the  total  output  of  exportables  in  country  Z,  Sz=Sz+
where  s4  represents  the  output  of  country  Z's  domestic  sector  and  let  s  represent
aggregate industry  output, s=sA+sB.  The demand for the output of the Southern nations
is  assumed  to  be  a  downward-sloping  function  of  output.  Market  demand  satisfies
P(1+T)=D(s),  where D'S50.
As  in  equation  (4),  the  zero-profit  conditions  for  foreign  investments  in
countries A  and B  with  country A in  the trade accord  satisfy:
(13a)  eA (1-tA)P(l+)a  =  r.
(13b)  OB  (1-tB)Pb  =  r
In  addition  to  the  producer  terms  of  trade,  P,  there  are  four  determinants
of  the  magnitude  of  foreign  investment  which  will  be  attracted  by  the  target
countries.  The  first  is  country  risk,  determined  by  eA  and  0B,  the  probabilities  that
11countries  A  and  B  will  comply  with  national treatment.  The  second  is  tA and  tB,  the
tax  rates  faced  in  the  two  countries  given  compliance.  The  third  determinant  is  the
relative  productivity  in  countries  A  and  B,  determined  by  parameters  a  and  b.  The
last  determinant  is  the  magnitude  of  the  terms  of  trade  advantage  enjoyed  by  the
Southern  partner  nation,  T.
3.2  Target nation  taxation decision.
We  again  assume  that  both  Southern  nations  have  committed  to  national
treatment  towards  foreign  investors.  We  also  assume  that  each  nation  faces  a  penalty
of  losing  a  OZQ share  of  its  output  for  violation  of  national  treatment  where  z  is
an  exogenous  constant fraction  and 0  is defined as above.9
Let  WB represent  the  payoff  to  country  B  from  choosing  compliance  with
national treatment.  WB satisfies:
(14)  p  (tB  +  =s).
Alternatively,  let  WB  represent  the  payoff  to  country  B  from  choosing  complete
taxation,  which satisfies:
(15)  4B  =  p(s!  +  sB(  B ).
Let  QB  represent  the  realization  of  2  which  leaves  country  B  indifferent  between
compliance  and complete  taxation  (W  B=W4).  OB  satisfies:
(16)  Q  =-
9Allowing  the  countries  to  have  different  distributions  of  Q  would  produce
qualitatively  the  same  results  and  would  only  be  relevant  in  terms  of  diversification
potential,  which we do  not  focus on in  this paper.
12When making its taxation decision, country A must consider the additional
loss from losing the  benefits of the trade accord. Let  WA  represent the payoff from
complete compliance  with national treatment. W4 satisfies:
(17)  W4 =  T+  s
Alternatively, let  ;V 4 represent the  payoff  to  country A  from  choosing complete
taxation, which satisfies:
(18)  Vl  =  p(sA  +  sA  )(J _  0A0)
Let  OA* represent the  realization of  n  which leaves country A  indifferent between
compliance and complete taxation (W=A4).  QA  satisfies:
(19)  D  =  A [I - (1+T)(tS  +S)/(s  +<)  ]
As  noted  in  the  previous  section,  a  positive probability of  full  taxation
requires a  parameter restriction. 10 To  motivate this  parameter restriction,  we make
the assumption that under national treatment investment in  countries A  and B  would
earn  positive  profits  in  the  absence  of  country  risk.  This  is  ensured  by  the
constraint:
(20)  (1 tZ)P  2  r,  (Z=A,B;  z=a,b).
oA  and  8B  can  then  be  found by  substituting QA  *and  QB  respectively for  Q  in
equation (5) above. Totally differentiating  with respect to KAand  KByields:
10Altematively, we  could  have  generalized the  analysis to  include  zero  foreign
investment in the form of corner solutions.
13(21)  8 =  - f( 4*)(1+i)a(J-tA)sA/,1A(s4;s+4) 2 < o
aK4
and:
(22)  Be  =  f (B*)b(l-tB)4/1B(s  5s)2  <  O.
n
As above, we express the price earned by the Southern partner nation as P(I +-r), where
in the absence of the accord T=  0  and under the accord T=T.  Substituting  T  for T  and
totally differentiating  yields:
(23a)  eT  f(/)(J/p  A  )  >  0.
a-c
aeB
(23b)  =  O.
3.3 Implications  for International  Capital  Flows
We  can  again  examine  the  impact of  the  trade  accord  by  conducting
comparative static exercises concerning the implications of an increase in  T.  We show
in the appendix that the comparative static results satisfy:
dKA  [  B]
(24a)  [-  jl  ±  T  ]c  |8 9 P2 eB
(24b)  dn  A  aoA  A  8[  (l+raBBbPlPA <  0.
where  A  is  the  determinant  of  the  matrix  of  the  system  shown  to  be  positive  in  the
appendix and P'=8P/8s50d
The  comparative static exercises demonstrate that the  impact of  the  trade
accord is an increase in  investment in the  Southern partner nation and a decrease in
investment in  the  other  Southern nation.  The  magnitude of  this  impact  for  both
14nations  is  increasing  in  OA, the  probability  of  compliance  by  country  A with  national
treatment,  and  aeA/aT,  the  increase  of  this  probability  due  to  increases  its  terms  of
trade  advantage under  the trade  accord.  Consequently,  the trade  accord,  by  enhancing
Southern  partner  credibility  through  granting  it  a  tariff  advantage,  generally
increases  investment  in  the  Southern  partner  nation  at  the  expense  of  the  Southern
non-partner  nation.
It  is  easy  to  show  by  contradiction  that  the  expansion  in  output  in  country
A  must  be  larger  than  the  contraction  in  output  in  country  B,  resulting  in  a  price
decline.  Assume  that  P  does  not  decline.  Equations  (lOa)  and  (lOb)  imply  that  in
equilibrium  both  countries  would  be  riskier  (oZ  would  be  smaller).  This  is  possible
only  if  investment  increases  in  both  countries,  which  implies  higher  output  and  a
decline  in  price.  More  formally,  recall  that  the  change  in  output  with  respect  to  -r
in  country  Z  (Z=A,B)  satisfies  zaKZ/la.  The  relative  output  change  in  the  two
countries  satisfies:
b(dK4/dT)  abeBPI
a (dKO/dt)  abeBP,  +  aP(a B/aK1B)
which demonstrates  that aggregate output increases.
However,  the impact on aggregate foreign investment is ambiguous depending
on the relative  productivity  of the Southern partner.  By equations (21a)  and  (21b):
dKB/dT  B
(26)  - -d-/d - =boBP,  +  P(aeB/aKB).
Examining  equation  (26),  if  asb  (the  Southern  partner  is  less  efficient  than  the  rest
of  the  South),  the  increased  output  must  be  supported  by  increased  investment.  If
a>b,  however,  the  superior  productivity  of  the  Southern  partner  may  lead  to  smaller
aggregate  foreign  investment  from  the  North.  In  this  case,  while  Southern  aggregate
output expands,  investment from  the rest of  the South is diverted more  than fully.
15The  potential  for  investment  diversion  will  also  depend  on  the  relative
size  of  the  Southern  partner  nation  to  other  potential  Southern  locations  for
investment.  To  see  this,  let  A  represent  the  relative  size  of  the  Southern  partner
nation  within  the  South,  x =sB1(sA +sB),  and  £  represent  the  elasticity  of  Northern
demand,  £=-D'sID.  Substituting into (24) then yields:
dKBI/dT  aeB
(27)  =
dKA/dT  beBeA  +  m.
where  m=- (aEB/aKe)(P 2/sA) > 0  and bounded.
If  the  Southern  partner  nation  represented  the  entire  South,  A converges  to
0  and  the  offsetting  effects  vanish.  For  more  moderate  values  of  A,  the  results
depend  on  the  value  eX.  Smaller  aggregate  investment  would  result  if  the  Southern
partner  is  more  productive  (a>b)  and  eA  is  large  enough  (i.e.  demand  is  highly
elastic  and/or  the  Southern  partner  is  relatively  small  within  the  South).  An
interesting  extreme  case  is  obtained  when  the  Southern  partner  is  extremely  small
within  the  South  (i.e.  A  is  close  to  1).  In  that  case  it  is  easy  to  obtain  that  in
the  limit  equation  (21a)  converges  to  equation  (9).  In  general,  the  expressions
obtained  in  the  previous  section  correspond  to  the  limiting  cases  A  =  1,  or  the
Southern  partner  being  "small"  within the  South.
3.4  Welfare Analysis
3.4.1  Impact  on Northern  Partner Welfare
Finally,  we  turn  to  the  question  of  the  welfare  implications  of  the  trade
accord.  Since  citizens of  countries A and B do  not consume the output  of the  industry
and  production  is  competitive  with  the  world  rate  of  interest  r  taken  as  given,  there
are  two  channels  for  the  trade  accord  to  affect  welfare  in  this  simple  model:  By
affecting  consumer  surplus  in  the  Northern  partner  nation,  and  by  affecting  the
16expected magnitude and  distribution  of Southern  income.
We  begin  by  analyzing  the  welfare  impact  of  the  trade  accord  on  the
Northern  partner  nation.  As  we  showed  above,  the  existence  of  the  trade  accord  will
result  in  a diversion  of  investment from country B  to  country A.  See Figure  1. Let  PO
and  Pl  represent  the  equilibrium  consumer  price  in  the  absence  and  presence  of  the
trade  accord  respectively.  The  trade  accord  achieves  a  reduction  in  the  price  paid  by
consumers  in  the Northern  trade partner  from  P0 to P1. However,  only  imports of  the
B non-partner  nation,  represented  in  the  graph  by  sI,  are  subject  to  tariff.  Assuming
that  all  tariff  revenues  are  repatriated  to  consumers,  then,  the  net  impact  of  the
trade  accord  on  Northern  partner  consumer  surplus  is  equal  to  the  area  of  region  III
(reflecting  the  mitigation  of  the  trade  distortion),  plus  area  V  (reflecting  the
B price  reduction  in  the  portion  of  trade  subject  to  tariffs,  s1 )  minus  area  IV
(reflecting  the  reduction  in  tariff  revenue  in  the  portion  not  subject  to  tariffs,
in  excess  of the price decline).
We  analyze  the  impact  of  the  trade  accord  formally  by  positing  that  the
accord  yields  an  advantage of  terms  of  trade  advantage  of  T,  where  OT5-Tr,  and  then
integrating  the  implications  of  changes  in  T  from  0  to  T.  Let  AWN  represent  the
resulting  welfare  change in  the Northern  partner  nation.  We show  in  the appendix  that
AWN satisfies:
(28)  AWN  [  +  a(I  ]  psA]dT
where  1P  is defined  in  the  appendix.  T>0  is  a  necessary,  but  not  sufficient,  condition
for  AWN>O.
AP is  of  ambiguous  sign  due  to  the  loss  in  tariff  revenue  from  country  B
resulting  from  trade  diversion  under  the  trade  accord.  This  loss  is  increasing  in  b
and  oB,  two  terms  which  reflect  the  attractiveness  of  country  B  as  a  location  for
17production.  Given  that  '  is  positive,  which  necessarily  holds  when  the  Northern
partner  nation  benefits  from  the  accord,  (26)  demonstrates  that  AWN is  increasing  in
both  A  and  (aoA/a-).  Integration  with  country  A  is  more  likely  to  be  welfare
enhancing  for  the  Northern  partner  country  the  greater  the  security  of  investments  in
the  Southern  partner  nation,  and  the  greater  the  positive  impact  of  the  trade  accord
on the riskiness  of investments  in that country.
The  intuition  behind  this  result  follows  from  the  traditional  customs  union
analysis  of  the  trade-off  between  trade  creation  and  trade  diversion.  Lowering  the
sovereign  risk  of  your  trading  partner  enhances  your  gains  from  trade  with  that
trading  partner.  In  the  traditional  literature,  the  welfare  analysis  of  trade-
diverting  customs  unions  centers  on  choosing  the  proper  customs  union  partner,  i.e.
that  with  which  you  will  enjoy  the  greatest  gains  from  trade.  The  trade  accord,  by
enhancing  the  environment  for  foreign  investment in  country A,  actually enhances  the
gains from  trade with  that country.
Moreover,  the  degree  to  which  the trade  accord  enhances  the penalty  faced
by  the  Southern  partner  nation  for  non-compliance  with  national  treatment  is  directly
increasing  in  the  gains  from  trade  between  the  Northern  and  Southern  partner.
Consequently,  the  impact  of  the  accord  on  sovereign  risk  provides  an  independent
reason  that  the  potential  for  welfare  gains  are  increasing  in  the  gains  from  trade
between the two  partners.
3.7.2  Impact  on Southern  income.
The  trade  accord will  affect the income  of the  two Southern  nations through
its  impact  on  the  value  of  the  output  the  domestic  sector  of  those  nations  and
through  its  impact  on  tax  revenues  generated by  foreign  direct  investment.  Note  that
expected revenues must  include payoffs  in states where expropriation  takes place.
18Define E(LF)  as the  expected income  earned by  country  Z  (Z=A,B).  E(UZ)
satisfies:
(29)  E(Z)=  oZvZ + f  WZf(2)do;  (Z=A,B).
Invoking  the  envelope  theorem,  differentiating  E(U4)  with  respect  to  T
yields:
aE(UO)  A (assA+sA)  +  +  dKny  +  A1
(30)  =  P[(-  p)  +  a d[oAl+)  +  wA
where:
*Z
(31)  Z  = f  (l1-,OZ)f(Q)dQ,  (Z=A,B).
Equation  (30)  identifies  three  channels  through  which  the  welfare  of  the
Southern  partner  nation  is  affected  by  the  trade  accord:  The  first  term  reflects  the
direct  positive  increase  in  earnings  due  to  the  tariff  advantage.  The  second  term
reflects  the  decline  in  terms  of  trade  suffered  by  the  Southern  partner  nation  due  to
the  increase  in  supply.  The  third  term  reflects  the  increase  in  expected  revenue  from
the  foreign  sector  due  to  the  increase  in  foreign  investment.  While  the  first  and
third  terms  are  positive,  the  net  impact  on  the  Northern  partner  nation  is  ambiguous
because  of the negative terms  of trade effect  captured by  the second term.
Similarly,  differentiating E(W3)  with respect to  r  yields:
(32)  ~~~~aE(LJB)  asEO  dI4
(32)  =  p  (a  + b  d  [BtB +  B]  <  o.
The  components  of  (32)  are  analogous to  the  final  two components  of  (30).  The  first
term  reflects  the  decline  in  terms  of  trade  suffered  by  country  B  due  to  an  increase
in  supply  from  the  South,  while  the second  term  reflects  the decrease  in  country  B's
expected  revenue  from  its  foreign  sector,  due  to  the  decrease  in  its  foreign
19investment.  These  two  effects  are  both  negative,  leading  to  the  unambiguous  result
that  the trade  accord reduces the welfare  of the alternative Southern  nation.
With  the  possible  exception  of  a  large  drop  in  market  price  due  to  the
erosion  of  monopoly  power,  then,  the  accord  favors  the  Southern  partner  nation  and
harms  the  other  Southern  nation.  The  impact  on  the  South  as  a  whole  is  therefore
ambiguous.  Combining  equations (30)  and (32) and  simplifying yields:
jj<A  ~~b2[Bt  ]
(3)  aE(UA  +UB)  =P[A(,AA  +  dK 4 dKBn
atr  [  + a dn[{A(l+T)t4+,pA]  +  bd[eBtB+  ]]
P'  asr
+  p  aT  [E(U) +E(U)] P aT
Equation  (33)  indicates the  ambiguity  in  the  impact  of  the  trade  accord  on
Southern  welfare  as  a  whole.  The  second  term  in  (33)  is  unambiguously  negative,
reflecting  the  deterioration  in  the  terms  of  trade  for  the  South  due  to  the  increase
in  output.  To  the  degree  that  the  trade  accord  erodes  the  ability  of  the  South  to
exercise  its  monopoly  power,  it  can  lead  to  a  deterioration  in  Southern  terms  of
trade.  Consequently,  holding  all  else  equal,  the  trade  accord  will  be  more  likely  to
be  welfare  increasing  for  the  South  as  a  whole  the  greater  is  the  elasticity  of
demand for  its  exports  in the North.
Looking  at  the  first  term  in  (33),  we  see  the  direct  impact of  the  increase
in  terms  of  trade  for  the Southern  partner  nation  and  the  tradeoff  between  the  impact
of  the  increase  in  investment  in  the  Southern  partner  nation  and  the  decrease  in
investment  in  the  alternate  nation.  This  term  is  of  ambiguous  sign.  Nevertheless,  it
is  interesting  to  note  that  the  term  is  increasing  in  oAtA and  decreasing  in  OBtB.
20Holding  all  else  equal,  the  welfare  impact  on  the  South  as  a  whole  is  greater  the
larger  is  the  relative  tax  rate  weighted  by  the  probability  of  compliance  with
national  treatment  in  the  Southern  partner  nation.  The  intuition  behind  this  effect
is  that  shifting  output  from  a  high  tax  country  to  a  low  tax  country,  holding  capital
inflows  constant,  results  in  a  net  loss  in  Southern  tax  revenues.  This  can  also  be
understood  as  an  "erosion  of monopoly power"  effect.  The  ability of country  B to  tax
its  foreign  sector  and  still  attract  capital  inflows  is  hindered  by  the  quality  of
the  environment  of country  A as  a haven for  foreign  investment.  The trade  accord,  by
enhancing  this  environment,  can actually harm the  income of the South as a  whole.
IV.  Conclusion
The  general  perception  is  that  the  most  important  implications  of  North-
South  trade  accords  such  as  NAFTA  are  likely  to  concern  their  impact on  investment
flows.  In  this  paper,  we  have  made  an  initial  effort  to  understand  the  channels
through  which  trade  accords  can  affect  North-South  investment  flows.  Our  analysis
shows  a  potential  link  between  trade  accords  and  investment flows through  the impact
of  the  accords  on  the  ability  of  Southern  partner  governments  to  make  commitments
concerning  treatment  of  foreign  investment.  We  show  that  these  accords  can  affect
both  the magnitude  and  the pattern  of  inward  investment and  production,  implying  the
possibility  of  both  trade  and  financial  diversion  stemming  from  a  bilateral  regional
trade accord.
While  the paper  demonstrates  that  novel effects  emerge under  sovereign  risk
which  must  be  addressed  when assessing the welfare  implications of  trade  accords,  the
qualitative  policy  conclusions  from  the  paper  are  similar  to  those  in  the  old  trade-
diverting  customs  union  literature  [Viner  (1950)1:  The  greatest  gains  from
integration  still  are  achieved  when  integration  takes  place  between  the  countries
21which  have  the  greatest  potential  gains  from  trade.  The  distinction  introduced  here
is  that  these  gains  now  include  both  current  trade  and  inter-temporal  trade  through
foreign  investment.  For  example,  in  our  welfare  analysis  in  the  previous  case,  the
possibility  of  Northern  partner  welfare  loss  from  the  accord  was  greatest  when  the
"net-of-expropriation-risk"  high  productivity  target  nation  was  not  included  in  the
accord.  Consequently,  while  North-South  integration  highlights  different  issues  than
those  in  previous  trade  accords,  a  nation  still  does  best  by  integrating  with  those
which  yield  it the  greatest gains  from  trade.
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1.  Comparative  Static  Exercises
Substituting  T  for  T  and totally differentiating (13a)  and  (13b) yields:
(I  +  P +0  O'  +  labp  [F(  +r
The determinant  of the matrix  satisfies:
(A.2) P(1+-r)  ] ]  P  +  Eo  |,KB] + baB[eA  > °
Solving:
(S  3)d  =  p 0A  +  (I+z)][SP  +eBbP  ]/E 
(A.4)  n  =  aoBPPA  +  _( 1 +T)l/T  <T
2.  Derivation  of equation  (28):
Let  WN  represent  welfare  in  the  Northern  partner  nation,  and  Tr  represent
the  tariff  advantage  enjoyed  by  the  Southern  partner  nation  under  the  accord.
Northern  partner  welfare satisfies:
(A.5)  WN  =  [-PsB  +  (  P--a)PA  - +  D(x)dx - (1+)Ps
where  D(x)  represents  the  Northern  partner  country  demand  curve.  The  impact  of  the
23trade  accord  can  be  represented  by  increasing  T from  0  to  T.  Let  AWN represent  the
resulting  welfare  change  in the Northern  partner  nation.  AWN satisfies:
(A.6)  dWN  d  +  __  5  P
Substituting for  (aP/aT) and simplifying,  we obtain:
(A.7)  W  o  f  P()  ±  +  B]  - Pl  +)i+sB]T_  psA]dT
Substituting  from  equations  (A.3)  and  (A.4),  the  solutions  for  dKA/dT  and
dKB/dr,  and  simplifying yields:
(A.8)  TWN  =  )  {49A  +  ]PSAdT
where  '  satisfies:
(A.9)  T=  aP2 /D  [P'[(l±  A+SB]  -P(I  + 
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